


















on	 the	 Greek	 regional	 and	 national	 labour	 markets	 and	 the	 compositional	 and	 price	
adjustments	in	response	to	this.	We	find	elements	of	economic	dynamism,	with	some	sizeable	
price	adjustments	in	the	economy	of	the	Greek	capital,	Athens;	but	overall	our	results	show	




































peripheral	 regions,	 predicting	 a	 widening	 of	 regional	 inequalities	 during	 the	 economic	
recovery	(despite	evidence	of	regional	convergence	during	the	crisis	–	Monastiriotis,	2014b)	
and	a	particular	advantage	for	the	metropolitan	region	of	Athens.	More	recent	studies	have	




(our	 ‘output	 gap’)	 and	 unemployment.	 Studies	 covering	 the	 period	 prior	 to	 the	 crisis	 for	
Greece	have	shown	limited	regional	adjustments	in	this	regard	for	the	country.	For	example,	
Apergis	and	Rezitis	(2003)	have	found	a	low	responsiveness	of	unemployment	to	changes	in	
GDP	 (especially	 to	 positive	GDP	 growth)	 for	 all	 but	 two	 regions	 and	 generally	 little	 inter-
















Evidence	during	 the	crisis	and	post-crisis	periods	 is	more	 limited.	At	 the	national	 level	 for	
Greece,	 the	 studies	 by	 Bournakis	 and	Christopoulos	 (2017),	 Koutroulis	 et	 al	 (2016),	 Katris	
(2016)	and	Karfakis	et	al	(2014)	have	confirmed	previous	findings	of	low	responsiveness	of	
unemployment	 to	 GDP	 changes,	 in	 the	 Okun’s	 Law	 tradition,	 showing	 also	 asymmetric	




for	 the	Okun	 Law	 elasticity.	 For	 example,	Melguizo	 (2017)	 has	 shown	 the	 unemployment	
elasticity	 to	 be	 higher	 for	 Spanish	 provinces	 with	 less	 diversified	 industries	 and	 greater	
specialisation	in	services;	while,	for	the	same	country,	Bande	and	Martin-Roman	(2018)	and	



































approach	 is	 as	 follows.	 First,	 we	 run	 a	 series	 of	 unemployment	 probits	 to	 estimate	 the	
contribution	of	various	individual	and	household	characteristics	to	individual	unemployment	
risk	 during	 and	 after	 the	 crisis,	 examining	 in	 this	 way	 how	 the	 crisis	 affected	 the	
unemployment	probability	for	different	groups	of	the	active	population	and	how	it	re-shaped	
the	 marginal	 employment	 probabilities	 of	 different	 marketable	 characteristics	 such	 as	
education	 and	 labour	 market	 experience	 (as	 proxied	 by	 age).	 Subsequently,	 we	 apply	 a	
decomposition	analysis	to	derive	a	number	of	distinct	components	of	the	overall	change	in	
unemployment,	identifying	specifically	a	measure	of	the	extent	of	the	shock	to	the	economy	
and	two	measures	showing	the	size	of	 the	compositional	and	price	adjustments	 that	 took	
place	in	response	to	this	shock.	While	we	examine	these	adjustments	across	the	13	NUTS2	
regions	of	Greece,	our	focus	in	this	paper	is	on	the	case	of	the	Greek	capital,	Athens,	which	





























presenting	an	advantage	 in	 terms	of	 adjustment	and	economic	 resilience	both	during	 the	
crisis	and	during	the	economic	recovery.		
The	structure	of	the	paper	is	as	follows.	The	next	section	discusses	our	empirical	approach	















an	extended	 ‘Mincerian’	 specification	which	 includes	 the	 standard	 controls	 for	 education,	
gender	and	age,	 amended	by	 various	 socio-demographic	 characteristics	 (ethnicity,	marital	
status,	 household	 size,	 status	 in	 the	 household).	 Although	 our	 choice	 of	 right-hand-side	
variables	is	limited	by	data	availability	in	the	Greek	Labour	Force	Survey,	we	note	that	this	set	
of	regressors	is	used	very	commonly	in	similar	studies	in	the	literature.5		
Given	 that	 the	 ‘choice’	 between	 employment	 and	 unemployment	 is	 conditional	 on	 an	
individual’s	participation	 to	 the	 labour	 force,	we	also	estimate	our	unemployment	probits	
using	 a	 Heckman	 correction	 for	 selection	 (Heckprobit).	 The	 procedure	 fits	 a	 first-stage	
regression	explaining	an	individual’s	probability	of	labour	force	participation	(activity	probit)	




and	 restricting	 to	 working-age	 economically	 active	 respondents,	 contains	 30,487,	 25,070	 and	 23,549	
observations	for	2008,	2013	and	2018,	respectively.		
5	See	Table	A.1	in	the	Appendix	for	variable	definitions	and	descriptive	statistics.	The	Greek	LFS	data	are	not	
longitudinal,	 so	we	 are	 unable	 to	 follow	 individuals	 across	waves/years	 and	 thus	 to	 control	 for	 individuals’	
unobservable	 characteristics	 (fixed	 effects).	 Although	 this	may	 potentially	 introduce	 some	bias	 to	 our	 year-
specific	estimates	for	the	individual-level	analysis	(e.g.,	if	both	education	and	employment	are	jointly	driven	by	










Fairlie,	 2005;	 and	 Bauer	 and	 Sinning,	 2008).	 This	 allows	 us	 to	 compare	 the	 (predicted)	
outcomes	between	two	samples	(in	our	case,	2008	versus	2013	and	2013	versus	2018)	and	
decompose	their	difference	into	various	components	broadly	grouped	into	two	categories:	
an	 “explained”	 component,	 which	 captures	 the	 part	 of	 the	 difference	 which	 is	 due	 to	
compositional	 differences	 in	 the	 two	 samples	 (endowment	 effect),	 valuated	 at	 base-year	






above	 parameters	 show	 predicted	 values.	 In	 this	 simple	 decomposition	 the	 first	 term	















using	alternative	decomposition	 techniques	 (Blinder-Oaxaca,	Neumark,	Daymont	and	Andrisani).	 The	 results	
(available	upon	request)	are	not	affected	by	the	choice	of	decomposition	method.		
8	The	application	of	non-linear	decomposition	techniques	to	the	case	of	unemployment	risk	and	in	particular	in	
relation	 to	 the	 crisis	 (or	more	 generally,	with	 regard	 to	 differences	 over	 time)	 is	 surprisingly	 limited	 in	 the	
literature.	For	exceptions,	see	Bachmann	and	Sinning	(2012)	and	Kelly	et	al	(2013)	for	national-level	analyses;	
and	Lopez-Bazo	and	Motellon	(2013)	and	Monastiriotis	and	Martelli	(2013)	for	similar	analysis	at	regional	detail.		
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2008).	 In	 the	 context	 of	 non-linear	 (probit)	 model	 decompositions,	 this	 presents	 the	
additional	complication	that	the	derived	components	for	the	categorical	variables	included	in	
the	model	(e.g.,	the	age	groups)	are	not	independent	from	the	choice	of	the	omitted	base	
category	 (see	 Oaxaca	 and	 Ransom,	 1999).9	 To	 address	 this,	 we	 implement	 the	 iterative	
method	proposed	by	Yun	(2005),	which	“normalises”	these	effects	by	running	sequentially	a	
decomposition	 for	 each	 alternative	 base	 category	 and	 expresses	 the	 estimated	 effects	 as	
deviations	 from	 the	 grand	mean.	 Specifically,	 Yun’s	 (2005)	 correction	 is	 by	means	 of	 the	
“deviation	 contrast”	 transformation	 which	 renders	 the	 decomposition	 results	 for	 the	
categorical	variables	independent	of	the	choice	of	the	base	category.	
Given	that	our	underlying	models	(unemployment	risk	regressions)	are	estimated	with	the	





case	 of	 non-linear	 models,	 such	 as	 the	 unemployment	 models	 estimated	 here,	 full	
decomposition	of	the	Mills	ratio	is	mathematically	very	complex	and	computationally	near-
impossible.	As	a	result,	in	our	application	we	use	the	method	proposed	by	Duncan	and	Leigh	
(1980)	 and	 further	 explained	 in	Neuman	and	Oaxaca	 (2004),	which	 consists	 of	 estimating	
separately	 each	 selection-corrected	model	 (for	 each	 year)	 so	 as	 to	 deriving	 the	 selection-
correction	 terms10	 and	 subsequently	 subtracting	 the	difference	 in	 these	between	 the	 two	
groups	from	the	left-hand-side	term	in	equation	(1),	so	that:	



























to	 this	 component	 is	 a	 direct	measure	 of	 the	 change	 in	 unemployment	 that	 would	 have	
occurred	 between	 the	 two	 years	 under	 analysis	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 compositional	 and	
price-related	changes.	 It	 is	 thus	a	measure	of	the	shock	applied	to	the	economy,	between	
each	two	years,	independent	of	any	(price	or	compositional)	adjustments	that	may	have	taken	
place	and	may	have	smoothened	or	amplified	 this	 shock.	By	 this,	we	are	able	not	only	 to	




able	 to	 derive	 a	 measure	 of	 the	 overall	 resilience	 of	 the	 labour	 market,	 defined	 as	 the	
proportion	of	the	original	(exogenous)	shock	that	has	been	absorbed	through	compositional	
and	 price	 adjustments.	 This	 is	 a	 novel	 and	 to	 our	 knowledge	 unique	 approach	 to	 the	




We	start	by	 reviewing	 the	 individual	estimates	 concerning	 the	contribution	of	 the	various	
individual	characteristics	on	the	probability	of	unemployment	in	the	two	periods	(crisis	and	






local	 labour	 markets	 in	 Spain,	 by	 Martín-Román	 et	 al	 (2020),	 goes	 in	 this	 direction	 by	








	 2008	 2013	 2018	 2008	 2013	 2018	
	 Unempl	 Unempl	 Unempl	 Unempl	 Active	 Unempl	 Active	 Unempl	 Active	
Education		 -0.222***	 -1.561***	 -1.315***	 -0.315***	 2.401***	 -2.494***	 2.307***	 -2.150***	 2.412***	
		 (0.0383)	 (0.0904)	 (0.0809)	 (0.0851)	 (0.0699)	 (0.166)	 (0.0788)	 (0.212)	 (0.0854)	
Females	 4.335***	 5.487***	 6.583***	 5.766***	 -19.67***	 11.65***	 -16.29***	 11.34***	 -13.73***	
		 (0.334)	 (0.781)	 (0.679)	 (0.961)	 (0.655)	 (1.377)	 (0.713)	 (1.413)	 (0.733)	
Foreign-born	 -0.900	 9.641***	 4.714***	 -1.241	 8.432***	 8.356***	 8.534***	 4.915***	 5.222***	
	 (0.586)	 (1.240)	 (1.246)	 (0.763)	 (1.133)	 (1.613)	 (1.279)	 (1.610)	 (1.433)	
Married	 -3.663***	 -13.30***	 -11.06***	 -4.513***	 -1.426*	 -13.42***	 -0.821	 -13.55***	 1.221	
	 (0.355)	 (0.822)	 (0.711)	 (0.490)	 (0.731)	 (1.112)	 (0.816)	 (0.916)	 (0.811)	
Household	head	 -3.134***	 -6.812***	 -7.863***	 -4.115***	 17.44***	 -11.09***	 13.77***	 -12.01***	 14.09***	
	 (0.387)	 (0.856)	 (0.736)	 (0.723)	 (0.749)	 (1.160)	 (0.829)	 (1.225)	 (0.837)	
Household	size	 0.271**	 2.197***	 0.742***	 0.303*	 6.690***	 1.807***	 4.897***	 0.550	 4.896***	
	 (0.130)	 (0.287)	 (0.259)	 (0.167)	 (0.322)	 (0.380)	 (0.345)	 (0.344)	 (0.371)	
Age	15-24	 5.591***	 19.65***	 7.275***	 7.966***	 -55.79***	 42.04***	 -57.02***	 23.24***	 -61.07***	
		 (0.546)	 (1.405)	 (1.292)	 (1.935)	 (1.029)	 (3.812)	 (1.176)	 (4.721)	 (1.224)	
Age	25-34	 2.435***	 6.880***	 1.025	 3.109***	 -5.961***	 8.282***	 -3.894***	 2.426**	 -9.678***	
		 (0.402)	 (0.933)	 (0.871)	 (0.588)	 (0.898)	 (1.089)	 (1.076)	 (1.202)	 (1.161)	
Age	45-54	 -1.082**	 -2.438***	 -0.681	 -1.226**	 -15.20***	 0.619	 -14.41***	 0.875	 -13.09***	
		 (0.422)	 (0.913)	 (0.777)	 (0.536)	 (0.821)	 (1.311)	 (0.916)	 (1.130)	 (0.962)	
Age	55-64	 -1.754***	 -6.881***	 -0.766	 -1.527	 -46.25***	 9.761**	 -48.81***	 8.045***	 -45.27***	
	 (0.595)	 (1.205)	 (0.973)	 (1.088)	 (0.909)	 (4.182)	 (0.983)	 (3.103)	 (1.010)	
Number	of	kids	 	 	 	 	 -9.109	 	 -7.144	 	 -7.227	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.402)	 	 (0.449)	 	 (0.479)	
Regional	FE									(chi2)	 96.43***	 206.2***	 207.8***	 352.7***	 	 359.8***	 	 349.8***	 	
	(p-value)	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 	 0.000	 	 0.000	 	
Selection									(arthro)	 	 	 	 -7.795	 	 -69.21***	 	 -44.58***	 	
	(p-value)	 	 	 	 0.413	 	 0.000	 	 0.000	 	
Observations	 30,487	 25,070	 23,549	 46,257	 37,717	 34,886	
Net	unemployment	 8.15%	 52.24%	 52.35%	 9.00%	 67.10%	 63.93%	
Actual	unemployment	 7.45%	 26.39%	 19.17%	 7.45%	 26.39%	 19.17%	
Notes:	 Marginal	 effects	 (except	 for	 the	 ‘selection’	 variable,	 where	 the	 corresponding	 z=score	 is	 reported)	
calculated	at	sample	mean	values	for	all	variables	using	the	–margins,	dydx	atmeans–	command	in	Stata.	‘Net	
unemployment’	 is	 the	cumulative	standard-normal	probability	of	 the	estimated	 intercept,	 i.e.,	 the	predicted	










at	 the	 0.1%	 level.	 The	 negative	 sign	 obtained	 (-0.692)	 implies	 that	 during	 the	 crisis	 the	
characteristics	that	‘selected’	individuals	into	activity	were	correlated	with	a	higher	likelihood	
of	 employment	 for	 those	 individuals.	 This	 in	 turn	 suggests	 that	 during	 the	 period	 less	
employable	individuals	withdraw	from	the	labour	market	altogether	(a	‘discouraged	worker’	
effect,	 pushing	 less	 employable	 individuals	 towards	 inactivity).	 This	 pattern	 subsides	
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difference	 for	 these	 results	 qualitatively.	 Rather,	 the	 most	 interesting	 differences	 are	
between	years.		
Perhaps	the	most	important	of	these	differences,	in	economic	and	policy	terms,	concerns	the	
role	 of	 education,	 which	 is	 a	 significant	 factor	 influencing	 an	 individual’s	 probability	 of	
unemployment	in	all	years.	Prior	to	the	crisis,	an	additional	year	of	schooling	was	associated	
with	 a	 0.22%	 lower	 probability	 of	 unemployment	 for	 an	 individual	 with	 average	
characteristics.	The	impact	of	selection	in	explaining	this	result	was	rather	moderate,	as	even	
with	the	Heckman	correction	the	probability	remained	particularly	 low	(0.31%).	Looking	at	
the	 regional	 picture12	 (Figure	 2,	 top	 panel)	 shows	 that	 this	 concerns	 all	 regions	 quite	
horizontally,	with	the	majority	of	regions	showing	marginal	effects	for	the	education	variable	
below	 0.5%	 and	 only	 two	 regions	 (Thessaloniki	 and	 Western	 Macedonia)	 returning	
substantially	high	marginal	effects.	The	role	of	education	as	a	sorting	mechanism,	however,	
increased	substantially	with	the	crisis.	By	2013	the	employment	advantage	associated	to	one	
additional	 year	 of	 schooling	 had	 risen	 to	 1.56%	 for	 the	 individual	 possessing	 average	
characteristics	 –	 and	 to	 2.49%	when	 accounting	 for	 selection.	 Across	 the	 country,	 in	 this	
period	 only	 three	 regions	 showed	marginal	 effects	 for	 education	 below	 traditional	 levels	
(below	1.0%),	while	the	whole	of	the	north-west	part	of	Greece	(Epirus,	West	Macedonia,	




estimations,	 respectively)	 and	 stabilising	 to	 values	 above	 2.0%	 across	 the	 Greek	 territory	
(except	 for	 the	 regions	of	 Crete	 and	East	Macedonia	&	Thrace),	 suggesting	 that	 the	 crisis	
brought	 about	 a	 more	 permanent	 intensification	 of	 employment	 sorting	 on	 the	 basis	 of	


















sizeable	 (e.g.,	 4.3%	 in	 2008	 in	 our	 most	 conservative	 estimate)	 and	 seems	 to	 intensify	
throughout	 the	 period	 (or	 to	 persist	 in	 the	 recovery,	 according	 to	 the	Heckman-selection	
results)Importantly,	controlling	for	selection	increases	the	size	of	the	penalty	sizeably:	for	the	
crisis	period	(in	2013),	for	example,	the	simple	probit	estimates	a	female	penalty	of	5.5%	while	
the	 Heckprobit	 estimate	 is	 at	 11.6%.	 In	 this	 case,	 however,	 the	 spatial	 picture	 is	 less	
homogeneous.	 As	 is	 shown	 in	 the	 lower	 panel	 of	 Figure	 2,	 prior	 to	 the	 crisis	 substantial	
penalties	 ,	 of	 over	 20%,	 existed	 in	 regions	 such	 as	West	Macedonia,	 Peloponnese,	 North	
Aegean	and	Thessaloniki;	while	in	Athens	the	pre-crisis	female	penalty	was	minimal.	With	the	
crisis,	 the	penalty	persisted	 in	West	Macedonia	and	 increased	 in	Athens,	Western	Greece,	





























The	 effects	 of	 the	 other	 variables	 included	 in	 the	 models	 go	 generally	 in	 the	 expected	
direction.	 For	 those	 foreign-born	unemployment	probabilities	 increased	 substantially	with	
the	 crisis	 but	 subsided	 subsequently	 –	 while	 remaining	 higher	 than	 pre-crisis.	 Heads	 of	
households	 and	married	 individuals	 experienced	 lower	 unemployment	 risks	 pre-crisis	 and	
increasingly	so	during	the	crisis;	while	unemployment	remained	higher	for	individuals	living	













15	 Interestingly,	controlling	 for	selection	also	produces	an	old-age	employment	penalty,	unlike	 in	 the	simple	

























(large	 standard	 errors),	 owing	 to	 small	 effective	 sample-sizes.16	 Instead,	 an	 interesting	
regional	 picture	 is	 obtained	 from	 the	 regional	 fixed	 effects,	 representing	 the	 ‘baseline’	
unemployment	for	each	region-year.	As	is	shown	in	in	Figure	3,	in	all	regions,	baseline	(or	net)	
unemployment	 increased	dramatically	with	the	crisis,	by	more	than	the	actual	rise	 in	total	











of	 crisis	 and	 recovery,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 aggregate	 shock	 in	 each	 period,	 we	
implement	the	so-called	detailed	decomposition	analysis	using	the	Oaxaca-Ransom	(pooled)	




metropolitan	 region	 (Athens)	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 country	 (Rest	 of	Greece).	 As	mentioned	









panel,	 the	 rise	 in	 unemployment	 in	 Greece	 between	 2008	 and	 2013	 was	 of	 about	 21	
percentage	 points,	 a	 near-tripling	 of	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 (by	 293%).	 The	 increase	 in	
	
16	For	example,	in	the	2018	data,	out	of	a	total	of	23,549	observations	nationally,	five	of	the	15	regions	have	40	









of	 change	 of	 unemployment	with	 and	without	 selection	 is	 almost	 identical	 (-31.3%	 and	 -
30.2%).	In	this	period,	unemployment	declined	by	7	percentage	points	and	by	10	percentage	
points	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 Greece	 –	 owing	mainly	 to	 developments	 in	 some	 peripheral	 regions	
(Epirus,	Crete)	as	well	as	in	the	more	metropolitan	regions	of	Thessaloniki	and	Attiki	(see	Table	




as	 well	 as	 the	 detailed	 sub-components	 for	 the	 price	 and	 endowment	 effects.	 As	 was	
discussed	in	section	2,	the	estimated	fixed	effects	represent	the	change	in	the	intercepts	of	
the	 underlying	 unemployment	 regressions	 (adjusted	 to	 correct	 for	 the	 ‘decomposition	




component)	 that	may	have	taken	place	 in	 that	period.	On	this	basis,	we	can	 interpret	 the	
‘fixed	effect’	as	a	measure	of	 the	overall	 shock	 to	 the	 labour	market	 (whether	positive	or	
negative)	 and,	 consequently,	 all	 other	 ‘explained’	 and	 ‘unexplained’	 components	 as	 the	
(compositional	and	price-related)	adjustments	that	took	place	in	response	to	the	shock.	We	





fixed	 effect	 component	 is	 greater	 than	 100%,	 i.e.,	 it	 is	 larger	 than	 the	 actual	 increase	 in	
unemployment	observed	in	the	data.	The	size	of	the	shock	appears	very	different	between	















		 Greece	 Athens	 Rest	of	Greece	
	 Crisis		 Recovery		 Crisis		 Recovery		 Crisis		 Recovery		
(2008-2013)	 (2013-2018)	 (2008-2013)	 (2013-2018)	 (2008-2013)	 (2013-2018)	
Unemployment		 	      
at	period	start	 0.073	 0.288	 0.059	 0.293	 0.082	 0.286	
at	period	end	 0.288	 0.198	 0.293	 0.223	 0.286	 0.188	
change	 0.215	 -0.090	 0.234	 -0.070	 0.204	 -0.098	
%	change	 292.9%	 -31.25%	 397.45%	 -23.89%	 249.6%	 -34.27%	
without	selection	 269.6%	 -30.2%	 366.3%	 -28.9%	 232.5%	 -30.7%	
	       
Endowments	 -1.18%	 22.33%	 -4.23%	 33.71%	 0.57%	 20.71%	
Education	 -2.12%	 9.22%	 -2.38%	 23.00%	 -0.81%	 7.53%	
Age	(all	groups)	 -1.52%	 5.90%	 -1.10%	 3.17%	 -0.64%	 6.65%	
Gender	 0.96%	 -0.62%	 0.24%	 -1.02%	 0.64%	 -0.48%	
Ethnicity	 0.16%	 2.66%	 0.19%	 6.64%	 0.04%	 0.67%	
Marital	status	 1.09%	 0.96%	 0.08%	 -0.40%	 0.73%	 1.12%	
Household	size	 -0.11%	 3.14%	 -0.55%	 1.93%	 0.23%	 3.88%	
Household	head	 0.37%	 1.04%	 -0.71%	 0.28%	 0.37%	 1.35%	
	       
Prices	 -20.49%	 31.44%	 -64.08%	 85.86%	 -9.79%	 33.06%	
Education	 -24.87%	 16.33%	 -75.18%	 29.57%	 -19.64%	 17.55%	
Age	(all	groups)	 -0.81%	 -9.52%	 0.40%	 -5.64%	 -1.38%	 -10.71%	
Gender	 1.54%	 1.49%	 0.78%	 4.09%	 1.98%	 -0.04%	
Ethnicity	 -19.42%	 -20.78%	 -14.82%	 -18.29%	 -14.01%	 -15.82%	
Marital	status	 -0.60%	 1.46%	 0.10%	 -2.91%	 -0.95%	 3.53%	
Household	size	 24.13%	 43.67%	 24.48%	 79.14%	 24.73%	 41.22%	
Household	head	 -0.39%	 -1.12%	 -0.14%	 0.01%	 -0.66%	 -2.72%	
	       
Fixed	effect	 121.56%	 46.22%	 168.30%	 -19.86%	 109.21%	 46.53%	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Observations	 55,557	 48,619	 10,725	 9,407	 44,832	 39,212	
Shock	 0.261	 -0.0416	 0.394	 0.0139	 0.223	 -0.0456	
Adjustment	 0.046	 0.0484	 0.1599	 0.0839	 0.019	 0.0524	
Resilience	 17.74%	 116.35%	 40.58%	 603.60%	 8.43%	 114.91%	
Notes:	 Percentage	 contributions	 to	 the	 total	 between-samples	 difference	 (unemployment	 change).	
Decompositions	 implemented	 using	 the	 Oaxaca-Ransom	 method	 with	 pooled-sample	 coefficients	 with	
adjustment	for	selection	into	activity.		
	









saw	 a	much	more	modest	 adjustment	 through	 prices	 (collectively	 at	 9.7%	 and	 exceeding	
values	of	30%	only	in	the	South	Aegean,	East	Macedonia	&	Thrace,	Central	Greece,	Thessaly	






change	 (falling	 unemployment)	 during	 the	 period	 20013-2018.	 This	 was	 similar	 for	 most	
regions	in	the	country.	In	Athens,	however,	the	shock	continued	be	negative,	suggesting	that	
exogenous	 conditions	 remained	 adverse	 there,	 applying	 negative	 pressures	 on	 the	 local	
labour	market	(pushing	unemployment	up).	In	this	period,	compositional	changes	contributed	
much	more	significantly	 to	 the	reduction	of	unemployment	 (e.g.,	by	22%	nationally	 in	 the	
recovery	period	compared	to	by	1.8%	in	the	crisis);	while	price	adjustments	also	moved	in	the	
same	direction	and	also	in	a	more	intense	degree	(e.g.,	31.4%	versus	20.5%,	respectively	for	








as	 is	well	known,	 the	crisis	 in	 the	Greek	 labour	market	came	exogenously	 through	a	 fiscal	
policy	 shock,	 which	 affected	 hugely	 liquidity	 and	 demand	 conditions	 in	 the	 economy	
(including	demand	for	labour)	but	had	little	to	do	with	any	prior	shifts	in	the	supply	or	quality	
of	 labour	 in	 the	 country	 (Monastiriotis,	 2011).	 Thus,	 the	 endowment	 (“explained”)	
component	 contributed	 little	 to	 changes	 in	 unemployment.	 In	 turn,	 the	 recovery	 was	
combined	with	significant	 shifts	 in	 the	supply	of	 labour	 (including	 through	emigration	and	









in	 unemployment	 due	 to	 the	 endowment	 effect	 –	 results	 not	 shown	 but	 available	 upon	
request).	 On	 the	 whole,	 however,	 the	 endowment	 effect	 has	 contributed	 to	 lowering	
unemployment	in	both	periods	–	showing	that	the	overall	quality	of	the	labour	endowment	
went	 up,	 both	 during	 the	 crisis	 and	 after.	 This,	 despite	 common	 perceptions	 that	 the	
emigration	wave	instigated	by	the	crisis	has	led	to	a	significant	lowering	of	the	quality	of	the	
labour	 endowment	 in	 the	 country	 (through	 brain-drain	 –	 Cavounidis,	 2013;	 Labrianidis,	
2014).20	
Turning	 to	 the	 detailed	 decomposition	 results,	 we	 see	 that	 few	 of	 the	 variables	 produce	
effects	 of	 any	 significant	 magnitude.	 Among	 them,	 education	 stands	 out	 as	 the	 main	
contributor	 to	adjustment.	 In	 terms	of	 the	endowment	effect	of	education,	 this	 led	 to	an	
adjustment	(abating	the	rise	in	unemployment)	by	some	2.4%	in	Athens	and	0.8%	in	the	rest	
of	the	country	during	the	crisis;	and	a	much	larger	adjustment	(pushing	again	towards	lower	
unemployment)	 during	 the	 recovery	 period	 –	 accounting	 for	 as	 much	 as	 23%	 of	 the	
unemployment	change	in	Athens,	some	three	times	more	than	in	the	rest	of	the	country.	Two	
other	 variables	 appear	 to	 have	 had	 a	 significant,	 in	 terms	 of	 magnitude,	 impact	 on	
unemployment	 adjustments,	 both	 through	 the	 price	 component.	 Of	 them,	 ethnicity	
contributed	 to	 lowering	unemployment	during	 the	 crisis	 (by	19.4%	nationally)	 but	had	an	
effect	in	the	opposite	direction	(raising	unemployment)	during	the	recovery	period	(by	20.8%	
nationally)	–	reflecting	the	cyclical	patterns	of	intensified	and	then	subsiding	sorting	on	the	
basis	of	ethnicity	 seen	earlier	 (see	Table	1).	 Instead,	price	 changes	 for	 the	household	 size	
variable	worked	towards	pushing	unemployment	up	during	the	crisis	period	but	down	during	
the	 recovery	period.21	 In	 the	 recovery	period,	 the	price	 effect	 for	 household	 size	 appears	
particularly	 large,	 especially	 in	 Athens,	 where	 it	 accounts	 for	 over	 90%	 of	 the	 total	 price	
adjustment	 (79%	 of	 the	 total	 adjustment	 overall)	 –	 while	 for	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 country	 its	
contribution	is	almost	halved.	Of	the	remaining	components,	the	role	of	the	age	variables	is	









21	 The	 effect	 found	 for	 the	 crisis	 period	 implies	 that	 the	 incidence	 of	 unemployment	 increased	 for	 larger	
households	during	the	crisis.	Christopoulou	and	Pantalidou	(2018)	discuss	this	pattern	as	the	result	of	a	possible	



















































quality	marketable	 characteristics	 (e.g.,	 education)	 and	exogenous	 characteristics	 typically	
associated	with	less	unemployment	(e.g.,	being	male).	As	only	a	part	of	this	was	accounted	
for	by	selection/flows	into	and	out	of	inactivity	(with	inflows	into	the	workforce	by	previous	




(‘price	 effect’),	 i.e.	 through	 an	 intensified	 sorting	 of	 individuals	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	
characteristics.	 Driven	 mainly	 by	 developments	 in	 the	 Athens	 economy,	 nationally	 this	
sorting-based	adjustment	was	mostly	related	to	the	education	variable.	 In	response	to	the	
crisis,	employers	started	valuing	education	more	and	thus	more	educated	individuals	became	
more	 successful	 in	 maintaining/obtaining	 jobs	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 individuals	 with	 lower	
educational	qualifications.	In	the	periphery,	however,	this	rather	welcome	market	mechanism	
operated	 much	 less	 strongly.	 Instead,	 the	 main	 vehicle	 of	 price	 adjustment	 there	 was	 a	
change	 in	the	 'valuation'	of	ethnicity,	with	foreign-born	 individuals	being	 'priced-out'	 from	
jobs	(and	presumably	a	sub-set	of	them	exiting	the	Greek	labour	market	via	return	migration).		
During	the	recovery	Athens	continued	to	experience	a	negative	shock,	unlike	the	rest	of	the	
country,	 but	 also	 continued	 to	 exhibit	 much	 superior	 adjustment.	 Education	 sorting	
intensified	even	further	everywhere	in	the	country	and	this	time	labour-quality	adjustments	
became	more	prevalent,	 accounting	 for	between	34%	 (in	Athens)	 and	21%	 (in	 the	 rest	of	




both	 to	 policy	 and	 to	 the	wider	 discussion	 about	 economic	 resilience	 of	 places.	 Although	
aspects	such	as	‘structure’,	‘competitiveness’,	etc	–	as	identified	in	the	literature	(see,	inter	









the	 sub-national	 level,	 seeking	 to	 improve	 labour	market	 functioning	 across	 geographical	
areas.	 For	 regional	 policy,	 inversely,	 as	 well	 as	 for	 the	 regional	 literature	 on	 economic	
resilience,	our	results	suggest	that	more	attention	should	be	placed	on	the	labour	market	of	
regions,	 over	 and	 beyond	 the	 traditional	 attention	 afforded	 to	 aspects	 of	 structure	 and	


























Cavounidis	 J.	 (2013),	Migration	 and	 the	 economic	 and	 social	 landscape	 of	 Greece,	 South-
Eastern	Europe	Journal	of	Economics,	11(1),	pp.59-78.		














































Labrianidis	 L.	 (2014),	 Investing	 in	 leaving:	 the	 Greek	 case	 of	 international	 migration	 of	
professionals,	Mobilities	9(2),	pp.314-335.	






















Monastiriotis	 V.	 Macchiarelli	 C.	 and	 Lampropoulou	 N.	 (2019),	 Transition	 Dynamics	 in	
European	Labour	Markets	During	Crisis	and	Recovery,	Comparative	Economic	Studies	
(DOI:	10.1057/s41294-019-00084-1)		
Neumark	 D.	 (1988),	 Employers’	 discriminatory	 behavior	 and	 the	 estimation	 of	 wage	
discrimination,	Journal	of	Human	Resources,	23(2),	pp.279-295.	













Yun	 M.	 (2005),	 A	 simple	 solution	 to	 the	 identification	 problem	 in	 detailed	 wage	
decompositions,	Economic	Inquiry	43(4),	pp.766-772.	
	
	 	
24
	
		 Ap
pe
nd
ix
	
	 Ta
bl
e	
A.
1.
	V
ar
ia
bl
e	
de
fin
iti
on
s	a
nd
	d
es
cr
ip
tiv
e	
st
at
ist
ics
	
	
	
In
di
vi
du
al
-le
ve
l	s
um
m
ar
y	
st
at
ist
ics
	
Re
gi
on
al
-le
ve
l	s
um
m
ar
y	
st
at
ist
ics
	
Va
ria
bl
e	
De
sc
rip
tio
n	
M
ea
n	
St
.	D
ev
.	
M
in
	
M
ax
	
M
in
	
M
ax
	
	
	
20
08
	
20
13
	
20
18
	
20
08
	
20
13
	
20
18
	
20
18
	
20
18
	
Ac
tiv
e	
Ta
ke
s	t
he
	v
al
ue
	o
f	1
	if
	th
e	
in
di
vi
du
al
	is
	e
m
pl
oy
ed
	
or
	u
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
,	z
er
o	
ot
he
rw
ise
,	f
or
	a
ll	
th
os
e	
in
	
w
or
ki
ng
	a
ge
	(1
5-
64
)	
0.
65
9	
0.
66
5	
0.
67
5	
0.
47
4	
0.
47
2	
0.
46
8	
0	
1	
0.
64
3	
	
(T
he
ss
al
on
ik
i)	
0.
74
2	
	
(Io
ni
an
)	
Un
em
pl
oy
ed
	
Ta
ke
s	t
he
	v
al
ue
	o
f	1
	if
	th
e	
in
di
vi
du
al
	is
	
un
em
pl
oy
ed
	(I
LO
	d
ef
in
iti
on
),	
ze
ro
	if
	e
m
pl
oy
ed
,	
m
iss
in
g	
ot
he
rw
ise
,	f
or
	a
ll	
th
os
e	
in
	w
or
ki
ng
	a
ge
	
(1
5-
64
)	
0.
07
3	
0.
26
4	
0.
18
0	
0.
26
1	
0.
44
1	
0.
38
4	
0	
1	
0.
11
2	
	
(Io
ni
an
)	
0.
26
5	
	
(W
	M
ac
ed
on
ia
)	
Ed
uc
at
io
n	
Im
pu
te
d	
ye
ar
s	o
f	s
ch
oo
lin
g,
	b
as
ed
	o
n	
th
e	
de
gr
ee
	
re
po
rt
ed
	b
y	
th
e	
re
sp
on
de
nt
	
11
.8
9	
12
.3
3	
12
.8
6	
4.
07
9	
4.
00
6	
3.
90
9	
0	
25
	
12
.1
9	
	
(W
	G
re
ec
e)
	
15
.2
5	
	
(A
th
en
s)
	
Ge
nd
er
	(F
em
al
e)
	
Ta
ke
s	t
he
	v
al
ue
	o
f	1
	if
	th
e	
in
di
vi
du
al
	is
	fe
m
al
e,
	
ze
ro
	if
	m
al
e	
0.
50
6	
0.
50
5	
0.
50
9	
0.
50
0	
0.
50
0	
0.
50
0	
0	
1	
41
.5
2	
	
(W
	G
re
ec
e)
	
47
.0
4	
	
(A
th
en
s)
	
Et
hn
ici
ty
	(F
or
ei
gn
-b
or
n)
	
M
ea
su
re
d	
on
	th
e	
ba
sis
	o
f	s
el
f-r
ep
or
te
d	
lo
ca
tio
n	
of
	
bi
rt
h.
	T
ak
es
	th
e	
va
lu
e	
of
	1
	if
	th
e	
re
sp
on
de
nt
	w
as
	
bo
rn
	a
br
oa
d,
	ze
ro
	o
th
er
w
ise
	
0.
06
6	
0.
06
8	
0.
05
2	
0.
24
9	
0.
25
2	
0.
22
2	
0	
1	
1.
36
		
(E
	M
ac
	&
	T
hr
ac
e)
	
11
.9
7	
	
(S
	A
eg
ea
n)
	
Ho
us
eh
ol
d	
he
ad
	
Ta
ke
s	t
he
	v
al
ue
	o
f	1
	if
	th
e	
in
di
vi
du
al
	is
	se
lf-
re
po
rt
ed
	a
s	h
ea
d	
of
	h
ou
se
ho
ld
,	z
er
o	
ot
he
rw
ise
	
0.
48
1	
0.
45
7	
0.
47
9	
0.
50
0	
0.
49
8	
0.
50
0	
0	
1	
41
.4
6	
	
(W
	M
ac
ed
on
ia
)	
51
.9
6	
	
(T
he
ss
al
on
ik
i)	
Ho
us
eh
ol
d	
siz
e	
Co
nt
in
uo
us
	v
ar
ia
bl
e	
w
hi
ch
	m
ea
su
re
s	t
he
	n
um
be
r	
of
	p
eo
pl
e	
of
	a
ll	
ag
es
	in
	th
e	
ho
us
eh
ol
d.
	
3.
23
2	
3.
23
5	
3.
07
7	
1.
34
4	
1.
21
9	
1.
27
9	
1	
13
	
2.
87
	
	(I
on
ia
n)
	
3.
40
		
(W
	M
ac
ed
on
ia
)	
M
ar
ita
l	s
ta
tu
s	(
M
ar
rie
d)
	
Ta
ke
s	t
he
	v
al
ue
	o
f	1
	if
	th
e	
in
di
vi
du
al
	is
	
m
ar
rie
d/
co
ha
bi
tin
g,
	ze
ro
	o
th
er
w
ise
	
0.
61
2	
0.
58
9	
0.
59
7	
0.
48
7	
0.
49
2	
0.
49
0	
0	
1	
0.
57
		
(A
th
en
s)
	
0.
71
		
(E
	M
ac
	&
	T
hr
ac
e)
	
Ag
e	
De
riv
ed
	fr
om
	se
lf-
re
po
rt
ed
	y
ea
r	o
f	b
irt
h	
an
d	
sp
ec
ifi
ed
	a
s	a
	se
rie
s	o
f	d
um
m
y	
va
ria
bl
es
	(i
n	
fiv
e	
10
-y
ea
r	i
nt
er
va
ls)
	
		
	
		
	
	
		
	
	
	
	
Ag
e	
15
-2
4	
	
0.
15
9	
0.
15
2	
0.
14
1	
0.
36
6	
0.
35
9	
0.
34
8	
0	
1	
0.
03
6	
(C
	G
re
ec
e)
	
0.
07
4	
(S
	A
eg
ea
n)
	
Ag
e	
25
-3
4	
	
0.
18
9	
0.
17
8	
0.
14
1	
0.
39
2	
0.
38
2	
0.
34
8	
0	
1	
0.
14
6	
(Io
ni
an
)	
0.
20
9	
(S
	A
eg
ea
n)
	
Ag
e	
35
-4
4	
	
0.
22
3	
0.
22
1	
0.
21
8	
0.
41
6	
0.
41
5	
0.
41
3	
0	
1	
0.
25
0	
(E
pi
ru
s)
	
0.
35
8	
(A
tt
ica
)	
Ag
e	
45
-5
4	
	
0.
22
3	
0.
22
8	
0.
24
7	
0.
41
6	
0.
41
9	
0.
43
1	
0	
1	
0.
24
9	
(Io
ni
an
)	
0.
32
0	
(E
pi
ru
s)
	
Ag
e	
55
-6
4	
	
0.
20
6	
0.
22
2	
0.
25
4	
0.
40
4	
0.
41
6	
0.
43
5	
0	
1	
0.
13
3	
(S
	A
eg
ea
n)
	
0.
28
2	
(Io
ni
an
)	
Nu
m
be
r	o
f	k
id
s	
Nu
m
be
r	o
f	c
hi
ld
re
n	
(a
ge
	1
9	
or
	lo
w
er
)	i
n	
th
e	
ho
us
eh
ol
d	
	
0.
71
4	
0.
70
6	
0.
68
1	
0.
96
8	
0.
97
6	
0.
96
4	
0	
9	
0.
55
		
(Io
ni
an
)	
0.
77
5	
	
(W
	M
ac
ed
on
ia
)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
25
	
	Ta
bl
e	
A.
2.
	D
ec
om
po
sit
io
n	
re
su
lts
	a
nd
	a
na
ly
sis
	b
y	
re
gi
on
	
	
Un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t	
De
co
m
po
sit
io
n	
co
m
po
ne
nt
s	(
%
)	
An
al
ys
is	
co
m
po
ne
nt
s	
	
Re
gi
on
s	
Ab
s	c
ha
ng
e	
%
	ch
an
ge
	
En
do
w
m
en
ts
	
Pr
ice
s	
Fi
xe
d	
ef
fe
ct
	
Sh
oc
k	
Ad
ju
st
m
en
t	
Re
sil
ie
nc
e	
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
	
	
Cr
isi
s	p
er
io
d	
(2
00
8-
20
13
)	
Ea
st
	M
ac
ed
on
ia
	&
	T
hr
ac
e	
0.
17
1	
18
4.
8%
	
2.
0%
	
-5
0.
8%
	
14
8.
9%
	
0.
25
5	
0.
08
4	
32
.8
%
	
3,
62
5	
Ce
nt
ra
l	M
ec
ed
on
ia
	
0.
23
4	
34
4.
1%
	
3.
7%
	
-0
.9
%
	
97
.0
%
	
0.
22
7	
-0
.0
07
	
-3
.1
%
	
3,
32
5	
W
es
t	M
ac
ed
on
ia
	
0.
20
5	
15
0.
7%
	
0.
8%
	
-1
6.
1%
	
11
5.
1%
	
0.
23
6	
0.
03
1	
13
.1
%
	
1,
73
6	
Ep
iru
s	
0.
22
8	
25
5.
8%
	
1.
3%
	
3.
9%
	
94
.8
%
	
0.
21
6	
-0
.0
12
	
-5
.5
%
	
3,
71
0	
Th
es
sa
ly
	
0.
19
0	
24
2.
7%
	
4.
1%
	
-8
6.
4%
	
18
2.
3%
	
0.
34
6	
0.
15
6	
45
.1
%
	
3,
32
7	
Io
ni
an
	is
la
nd
s	
0.
05
4	
56
.0
%
	
-1
5.
7%
	
-4
8.
0%
	
16
3.
0%
	
0.
08
7	
0.
03
4	
38
.6
%
	
1,
27
7	
W
es
te
rn
	G
re
ec
e	
0.
22
4	
24
0.
5%
	
0.
1%
	
23
.7
%
	
76
.4
%
	
0.
17
1	
-0
.0
53
	
-3
0.
9%
	
3,
72
5	
Ce
nt
ra
l	G
re
ec
e	
0.
19
1	
22
3.
6%
	
1.
8%
	
-3
1.
3%
	
12
9.
6%
	
0.
24
8	
0.
05
7	
22
.8
%
	
3,
57
1	
At
tic
a	
0.
25
1	
34
6.
1%
	
-4
.2
%
	
-1
4.
0%
	
11
8.
1%
	
0.
29
6	
0.
04
5	
15
.3
%
	
4,
18
5	
Pe
lo
po
nn
es
e	
0.
15
2	
18
9.
6%
	
1.
6%
	
-9
.2
%
	
10
8.
0%
	
0.
16
4	
0.
01
2	
7.
4%
	
4,
10
3	
No
rt
h	
Ae
ge
an
	
0.
20
6	
46
9.
5%
	
8.
6%
	
26
.7
%
	
65
.0
%
	
0.
13
4	
-0
.0
72
	
-5
3.
8%
	
1,
18
8	
So
ut
h	
Ae
ge
an
	
0.
11
2	
16
0.
8%
	
2.
7%
	
-6
2.
7%
	
15
9.
5%
	
0.
17
8	
0.
06
6	
37
.3
%
	
1,
49
6	
Cr
et
e	
0.
23
3	
45
2.
5%
	
2.
3%
	
-1
0.
3%
	
10
7.
9%
	
0.
25
1	
0.
01
8	
7.
3%
	
4,
40
4	
At
he
ns
	
0.
23
4	
39
7.
5%
	
-4
.2
%
	
-6
4.
1%
	
16
8.
3%
	
0.
39
4	
0.
16
0	
40
.6
%
	
10
,7
25
	
Th
es
sa
lo
ni
ki
	
0.
25
8	
26
9.
6%
	
-0
.7
%
	
-4
.7
%
	
10
5.
6%
	
0.
27
2	
0.
01
5	
5.
3%
	
5,
16
0	
	
Re
co
ve
ry
	p
er
io
d	
(2
01
3-
20
18
)	
Ea
st
	M
ac
ed
on
ia
	&
	T
hr
ac
e	
-0
.1
02
	
-3
8.
6%
	
29
.9
%
	
-1
56
.8
%
	
22
6.
5%
	
-0
.2
31
	
-0
.1
29
	
55
.8
%
	
3,
80
5	
Ce
nt
ra
l	M
ec
ed
on
ia
	
-0
.1
00
	
-3
3.
1%
	
36
.7
%
	
45
.6
%
	
17
.7
%
	
-0
.0
18
	
0.
08
2	
-4
65
.0
%
	
3,
64
4	
W
es
t	M
ac
ed
on
ia
	
-0
.0
78
	
-2
2.
9%
	
19
.9
%
	
98
.5
%
	
-1
9.
0%
	
0.
01
5	
0.
09
3	
62
7.
0%
	
1,
59
6	
Ep
iru
s	
-0
.1
20
	
-3
7.
9%
	
24
.0
%
	
13
9.
5%
	
-6
3.
6%
	
0.
07
6	
0.
19
6	
25
7.
3%
	
2,
71
5	
Th
es
sa
ly
	
-0
.0
73
	
-2
7.
2%
	
21
.6
%
	
11
4.
2%
	
-3
6.
0%
	
0.
02
6	
0.
09
9	
37
7.
6%
	
3,
10
9	
Io
ni
an
	is
la
nd
s	
0.
00
5	
3.
4%
	
-7
9.
4%
	
-3
39
.8
%
	
53
2.
0%
	
0.
02
7	
0.
02
2	
81
.2
%
	
1,
34
1	
W
es
te
rn
	G
re
ec
e	
-0
.0
87
	
-2
7.
4%
	
23
.6
%
	
34
0.
2%
	
-2
63
.2
%
	
0.
22
9	
0.
31
6	
13
8.
0%
	
3,
49
4	
Ce
nt
ra
l	G
re
ec
e	
-0
.0
93
	
-3
3.
6%
	
23
.8
%
	
-2
.9
%
	
80
.0
%
	
-0
.0
74
	
0.
01
9	
-2
5.
0%
	
3,
17
7	
At
tic
a	
-0
.1
32
	
-4
0.
9%
	
16
.0
%
	
-2
9.
5%
	
11
2.
9%
	
-0
.1
49
	
-0
.0
17
	
11
.4
%
	
2,
46
1	
Pe
lo
po
nn
es
e	
-0
.0
77
	
-3
3.
2%
	
28
.2
%
	
9.
2%
	
63
.8
%
	
-0
.0
49
	
0.
02
8	
-5
6.
8%
	
3,
51
4	
No
rt
h	
Ae
ge
an
	
-0
.0
26
	
-1
0.
4%
	
61
.9
%
	
45
9.
6%
	
-4
19
.2
%
	
0.
10
9	
0.
13
5	
12
3.
9%
	
1,
23
8	
So
ut
h	
Ae
ge
an
	
-0
.0
51
	
-2
8.
2%
	
4.
6%
	
-2
25
.7
%
	
31
9.
6%
	
-0
.1
63
	
-0
.1
12
	
68
.7
%
	
1,
61
8	
Cr
et
e	
-0
.1
63
	
-5
7.
4%
	
16
.1
%
	
-5
8.
9%
	
14
2.
3%
	
-0
.2
32
	
-0
.0
69
	
29
.7
%
	
3,
70
9	
At
he
ns
	
-0
.0
70
	
-2
3.
9%
	
33
.7
%
	
85
.9
%
	
-1
9.
9%
	
0.
01
4	
0.
08
4	
60
3.
6%
	
9,
40
7	
Th
es
sa
lo
ni
ki
	
-0
.1
36
	
-3
8.
5%
	
9.
3%
	
12
2.
6%
	
-3
2.
2%
	
0.
04
4	
0.
18
0	
41
0.
5%
	
3,
79
1	
26
	
		
